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Deterring bribery: law, regulation
and the export trade
jeremy horder
“We’ve got to have rules and obey them. After all, we’re not savages. We’re
English, and the English are best at everything.”
(William Golding, Lord of the Flies, ch. 2)
The Bribery Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) deserves critical attention by virtue
of at least three of its key features. There is the wide-reaching new offence
of failing to prevent bribery (section 7(1)), the collapsing of the distinction
between public and private sector bribery (sections 1–5), and the wide
extraterritorial application of the law (section 12). These features will form
part of the background to the discussion here. My concern will be on the
impact these changes will have on UK businesses1 that trade – often
through subsidiary companies or agents – overseas. My speciﬁc focus will
be the impact of the new law on the arms trade, where more research and
data are available to assist the analysis, and respecting which the greatest
controversy concerning overseas trade has arisen.2 In exploring this con-
cern, I will consider whether the 2010 Act, which seeks to punish and deter
bribery (and the failure to prevent it) through the ordinary criminal law,
needs further buttressing in the form of regulatory intervention to reduce
the risks that bribery (or the failure to prevent it) will be committed.
I suggest that we have much to learn from the dominance of regulatory
1 I will for simplicity’s sake for the most part speak of ‘UK’ businesses or public ofﬁcials, and
of ‘UK’ law and the ‘UK’ Parliament, rather than seeking to distinguish when it would be
more appropriate to use terms such as ‘companies doing business in the UK’, ‘British
businesses’ or ‘the law of England and Wales’, and so forth. This will entail some inaccur-
acies in the text.
2 A controversy centred not only on the risk of bribery and corruption in the activities of
private ﬁrms, but also on the activities of public ofﬁcials whose job it is to assist those
companies when trading overseas: R. Neild, Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social
Evolution (London: Anthem Press, 2002), 139–40.
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law in the governance of export control. The ‘prophylactic’ character of
regulatory legal intervention in that ﬁeld provides an important example
of what could, and should, be done to further the goal of bribery preven-
tion, especially in relation to export trade itself. The absence of such a
regulatory infrastructure symbolises a broader failing. The 2010 Act,
whatever its legal merits, has not been adequately supported by an
unequivocal policy commitment to harness the energies of UK ofﬁcials
at all levels, at home and abroad, in the service of anti-corruption when
facilitating the advancement of commerce.
Law and regulation: towards a truly modern law of bribery
Criminal law and (corporate) compliance: a familiar story
In relatively recent times, a familiar story in criminal law enforcement
against companies runs along these lines.3 Prosecutors seeking to deter
and punish wrongful conduct in certain areas ﬁnd that they have at their
disposal only out-dated or poorly drafted criminal laws, often providing
only inappropriate or inﬂexible penalties. These laws in themselves,
together with the high standard of proof they carry, and the costs and
delay involved in invoking them, manage at one and the same time both to
provide obstacles to successful prosecution in anything other than the
clearest cases, and to inspire little or no respect among those liable to
prosecution.4 The result has been under-enforcement, and very substan-
tial reliance on negotiation to secure compliance, although that is a
strategy notorious either for the dubious compromises it involves or for
its ineffectiveness against serial offenders accustomed to evading the law.5
In some areas of commercial activity, the remedy for this defect has been
the creation or use of expert bodies to enforce more specialised forms of
regulatory criminal law, and sometimes also new forms of civil penalty
drawn up (and then used) in consultation with the relevant industry.
Together, these can provide a more effective and respected system of
enforcement, the more so when they buttress codes of conduct.6
3 For an analysis, see Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, Law
Com. CP No. 195, 2010, paras. 3.52–3.96, and App. A.
4 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’.
5 J. Black, ‘A Review of Enforcement Techniques’, in Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability
in Regulatory Contexts’, Law Com. CP No. 195 2010, App. A; K. Hawkins, Law as a Last
Resort (Oxford University Press, 2003).
6 See Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 3.83–3.102.
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The emerging ideal is that the criminal law, pursued through the trad-
itional route of prosecution in theMagistrates’ or CrownCourt, is reserved
for the most serious wrongdoing or for persistent ﬂouting of the law.7 Less
serious wrongdoing and, most particularly, the accidental or careless
creation of a threat thereof, is dealt with through specialised criminal
offences or civil penalties in the form of ﬁnes, restrictions on a licence,
expulsion from a licensing regime, or cancelling of or suspension from
membership of a trade association.8 An example is the approach now
taken to employers employing people with no right to work in the United
Kingdom.9 Alongside an older strict liability criminal offence,10 a new and
more serious criminal offence targeted at deliberate wrongdoers has been
created.11 Its function is not so much to support the strict liability offence,
as to support a newer system of civil penalties administered by an expert
body, the UK Border Agency.12 Such penalties involve (in a basic form) a
ﬁxed ﬁne for each person illegally employed, and ‘naming and shaming’ in
the Border Agency’s annual reports.13 How should one view the develop-
ment of the law of bribery against this general background?
In important ways, the picture appears to ﬁt well in terms of how
problems arose under the old law. Until the coming into force of the 2010
Act, England and Wales were governed by an out of date set of laws that
resulted in only a tiny number of prosecutions each year: only one or two
convictions for public sector bribery, and around ten convictions annu-
ally for (largely) private sector bribery.14 Even after the outdated domes-
tic legislation was extended in 2001 to cover, for the ﬁrst time, bribery of
foreign public ofﬁcials, prosecutions remained at a low level relative to
the number conducted by countries with a comparable share of inter-
national trade.15 The new law certainly improves the quality of the
prosecutor’s toolkit, and – insofar as this improvement becomes
common knowledge – that may do something to improve international
7 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 3.137–3.138.
8 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 3.137–3.139.
9 See the discussion in Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras
3.72–3.82.
10 Under the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, s. 8.
11 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, s. 21.
12 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, s. 15.
13 See www.ukba.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/employersandsponsors/
listemployerspenalties.
14 See, Law Commission, ‘Reforming Bribery’, Law Com. CP 185, 2007, para. 2.30.
15 See text at n. 3, above.
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business conﬁdence in the UK’s anti-corruption strategy.16 However,
some of the problems of a simple ‘criminal law-led strategy’17 to tackle
bribery are going to plague the new law just as much as they plagued the
old law. For example, the need for proof to the criminal standard of
bribes paid, for the purposes of a prosecution for failing to prevent
bribery under section 7, may involve very considerable delay and
cost, perhaps especially in relation to the discovery of documents (if
any exist), but also in relation to the costs of extradition proceedings
(if available), the use (often of dubious value) of covert human intelli-
gence sources, and the need to cooperate or collaborate with other
investigating jurisdictions (including the jurisdiction where the recipient
was based) having very different legal traditions and standards. In that
regard, the Serious Fraud Ofﬁce (SFO) faces an all too familiar dilemma.
Is it better to husband precious resources, so that they can be devoted to
the biggest cases posing perhaps the greatest legal, evidential and cross-
border challenges, but with the risk that excessive delay or failure will
bring the SFO into disrepute? Alternatively, should resources be spread
more thinly and criminal prosecution focused on less high-proﬁle cases
with better prospects for success (where, for whatever reason, other
prosecution authorities cannot or will not act)?
These problems are far from fatal, and may seem exaggerated in the
rudimentary form in which they have just been presented. However, they
throw into relief some crucial advantages of a ‘regulatory’ as opposed to a
‘criminal offence-led’ strategy, in some (if not all) contexts.18 A ‘criminal
offence-led’ strategy, as the name implies, relies on the deterrent effect of
the ordinary criminal process to reduce the incidence of unacceptable
risk posed or harm done in a given context. Such a strategy may not
necessarily be ‘second best’, simply because criminal proceedings are
expensive to invoke, may involve considerable delay, and require
high standards of proof that may be difﬁcult to meet. In some – perhaps
many – contexts, sporadic criminal law enforcement may be preferred to
regulatory intervention, even if the former is a less effective deterrent to
rule-breaking, because it is feared that the cure – the imposition of
16 On which see the text at n. 4, above.
17 For the term, ‘criminal offence-led strategy’, and a critical analysis of its utility in
tackling certain kinds of problem, see Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory
Contexts’, Part 2.
18 For this contrast, see Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’,
Part 2.
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regulatory burdens – will turn out to be worse than the disease, insofar as
it threatens people’s willingness to engage in the relevant activity at all.19
Where it is appropriately deployed, a regulatory strategy will typically
have a number of distinctive features. Four important ones are these.
First, such a strategy will usually be focused primarily on prevention and
minimising risk, or on changing future behaviour plans systematically,
and will probably much more rarely involve punishment purely for just
deserts’ sake.20 Secondly (a related point), a regulatory prosecution
strategy is likely to be focused on unacceptably risky practices in them-
selves, meaning that proof of harm done in consequence will often be
signiﬁcant only insofar as it highlights unacceptable risk-taking. Thirdly,
a regulatory strategy may involve giving priority to the use of specialised
context-speciﬁc criminal offences, or – or additionally – a ﬂexible range
of civil penalties that avoid the need for costly and lengthy criminal court
proceedings.21 Finally, a regulatory strategy will usually involve enforce-
ment carried out by an expert body or bodies, familiar with patterns and
kinds of offending as well as with the appropriateness of particular
sanctions.22
Two questions in relation to the development of a regulatory strategy
to counter bribery, alongside the new criminal offences, will be
addressed here. First, to what extent does the criminal law, including
the 2010 Act, already ﬂirt with some element of a regulatory strategy for
dealing with bribery? Secondly, is there a sufﬁciently strong analogy
between bribery and other kinds of corporate wrongdoing dealt with
through a mixture of traditional criminal offence-led and regulatory
strategies to make the case for a partly regulatory approach to bribery
compelling?
19 See, in this context, the Law Commission’s analysis of the law’s ‘criminal offence-led’
strategy for dealing with cyclists: Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory
Contexts’, Part 2. The threat posed by cyclists is one of low risk of relatively trivial harm.
By contrast, the prospect that having to obtain a licence to cycle, or the like, will deter
many people from cycling at all is very real; hence, the absence of regulatory oversight,
and the reliance on sporadic law enforcement to secure a tolerable degree of compliance
with the rules of the road.
20 For a subtle analysis of this point, illustrating how retributive thinking has recently come
to intrude on regulatory ideals in the road safety context, see S. Cunningham, ‘Punishing
Drivers Who Kill: Putting Road Safety First?’, Legal Studies, 27 (2007), 288–311.
21 Although that is not uncontroversial, see R. M. White, ‘Civil Penalties: Oxymoron,
Chimera and Stealth Sanction’, Law Quarterly Review, 126 (2010), 593–606.
22 See Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, Part 2.
200 jeremy horder
Comp. by: Ravishankar Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 7 Title Name: HorderandAlldridge
Date:3/1/13 Time:17:01:12 Page Number: 201
Beyond make-do-and-mend: in search of regulatory impact
Turning to the ﬁrst question, the Law Commission recommended an
offence of failing to prevent bribery by someone acting (in a loose sense)
on its behalf, with a defence that a company or partnership had adequate
procedures in place to prevent such wrongdoing.23 In making that
recommendation, the Law Commission regarded this offence as having
some regulatory dimension to it. The Commission remarked:
The new criminal offence that we are recommending is not regulatory in
nature … However, the new offence does have a regulatory dimension to
it in that the defence – proof that the company had adequate procedures
designed to prevent bribery being committed on its behalf – is concerned
with measuring the adequacy of ‘internal standards’ … that might other-
wise be disregarded. We regard this inclusion of a regulatory element as a
positive virtue, but so also is the fact that the offence is in itself an
ordinary criminal offence.24
The regulatory element was regarded as virtuous, in that it might encourage
companies to take prophylacticmeasures (central to any regulatory scheme)
to minimise risks, such as introducing or improving anti-bribery policies
and procedures appropriate to the size and nature of the company. This
viewwas in accordwith the government’s reaction to criticismby aHouse of
Commons Select Committee that it had done too little to address the risk of
bribery involved in granting export licences in relation to contracts to export
defence equipment and the like (considered further below).25 In response,
the Secretary of State for Justice published a UK Foreign bribery strategy, in
which it was said that there was a commitment to:
establish a clear legal, regulatory and policy framework for action against
foreign bribery. Law reform through the new Bribery Bill will be the
keystone of this approach but the strategy also reinforces links to the
wider international anti-corruption agenda – reﬂecting our commitment
to focus on the causal drivers of foreign bribery and deepen our collabor-
ation with international partners.26
However, probably motivated by fear that the reform of bribery law
would become tarred by broader criticisms of excessive bureaucratic
23 Law Commission, ‘Reforming Bribery’.
24 Law Commission, ‘Reforming Bribery’, paras 6.19–6.20.
25 Security of Arms Export Control: First Joint Report (2007/8) of the Committee on Arms
Export Controls (2008 HC 254), paras 115–117.
26 Ministry of Justice, ‘UK Foreign Bribery Strategy’, Cm 7791 (2010) (added emphasis).
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intervention to shape corporate participation in the market place, in
introducing the legislation the government sought to make clear that
its strategy was criminal offence-led and not regulatory. In the Impact
Assessment that accompanied the consultation on guidance concerning
what may count as ‘adequate procedures’ to prevent bribery, for the
purposes of the offence in section 7, the Ministry of Justice said that
the guidance would be concerned with broad principles of relevance, ‘if
[commercial organisations] are to avoid prosecution …’27 The Ministry
went on to add, ‘there is no regulatory framework to monitor compli-
ance’.28 So, there was consequently ‘no requirement on commercial
organisations to adopt anti-bribery procedures’.29 There is, then, to be
no analogy with the approach to, say, corporate manslaughter, where the
stigmatic criminal offence under the Corporate Manslaughter and Cor-
porate Homicide Act 2007, focused on harm done, is underpinned by an
already existing regulatory strategy centred on prevention and backed by
specialised offences under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. This
resolutely pure, criminal offence-led strategy (backed by a discriminating
prosecution policy) for bribery would normally be appropriate only
where the incentives to engage in valuable activities of the relevant kind –
in this instance, commercial trading overseas – will not be strong enough
if there are regulatory hurdles of any signiﬁcant kind that must be
surmounted to engage in that activity lawfully.30 However, there is little
or no evidence that people are deterred from participating – indeed, they
may actually be encouraged to participate – in UK-based national and
international markets by a moderate degree of regulation.31 As far as a
regulatory approach to deterring bribery is concerned there is, quite
simply, no evidence that, to use the government formula when consider-
ing legal intervention, ‘the proposed intervention itself [will or may
create] a further set of disproportionate costs and distortions’.32 On the
27 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations Preventing Bribery’
(section 9 of the Bribery Act 2010)’, Impact Assessment No. MOJ008, 2 August
2010, p. 5.
28 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations Preventing Bribery’.
29 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations Preventing Bribery’.
30 See, in this respect, the Law Commission’s analysis of a criminal offence-led, as opposed
to a regulatory, strategy towards cycling, as opposed to driving and car ownership: Law
Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 2.10–2.20.
31 See the discussion in J. Kitching, ‘Better Regulation and the Small Enterprise’, in
S. Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 155–73, at 156–8.
32 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations’.
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contrary, there is every reason to think that a regulatory approach is
required, alongside modernised general offences, because, using the same
government formula, ‘there are strong enough failures in the way
markets operate … [and] there are strong enough failures in existing
government interventions (e.g., waste generated by misdirected rules)’.33
The government’s economic justiﬁcation for modernising the criminal
law hinged on the law’s capacity to avoid:
A position where all businesses pay bribes in the course of competing for
contracts, and in particular compete on the basis of who can pay the
highest bribe. If all businesses, including overseas competitors, were to
offer the highest bribes they can, the cycle of corruption would be
perpetuated … The ideal position is for markets to operate efﬁciently
and for UK businesses to compete without making additional payments.34
Increasingly commonly, it is the function of more formal (self-)
regulatory strategies to play a role in securing compliance with sufﬁ-
ciently high standards on an adequately wide scale, in pursuit of ideal
market conditions for exchange.35 A sophisticated range of expert-led
interventionist strategies now exists to further such goals in a range of
contexts.36
In purporting to reject such a strategy for bribery and corruption, very
revealing in policy terms was the Secretary of State for Justice’s claim that
the offences under the 2010 Act are aimed at, ‘making life difﬁcult for the
mavericks responsible for corruption, not unduly burdening the vast
majority of decent, law-abiding ﬁrms’.37 There is, of course, an important
question begged here about what kind or degree of legal burdens will be
‘undue’; but of equal signiﬁcance is the fact that, if the 2010 Act is
principally aimed at ‘mavericks’, then this puts the failure to prevent
bribery offence in section 7 in tension with that aim. To begin with, the
33 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations’. On the importance of
regulation as a means of preventing market failure, see S. Weatherill (ed.), ‘The Challenge
of Better Regulation’, Better Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 1–18.
34 Ministry of Justice, ‘Guidance about Commercial Organisations’.
35 For example, such a strategy is pursued through the expert work of Trading Standards
ofﬁcials, the Competition Commission and the Financial Services Authority.
36 See the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and, for an example, the brief
analysis of the role of Trading Standards authorities in Law Commission, ‘Criminal
Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 3.89–3.96. See also the discussion of export
controls in the text at n. 69, below.
37 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance about Procedures which Relevant
Commercial Organisations can put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with Them
from Bribing (London: Ministry of Justice, 2011), p. 2.
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section 7 offence is one of strict liability, apt to catch failures to prevent
bribery by mavericks and non-mavericks alike. Moreover, the ofﬁcial
guidance now available on the ‘adequate procedures’ defence (presum-
ably, aimed principally at the non-mavericks) contains just the kind of
detail that one would expect in a regulator’s handbook or code. So, in
illustrating the ‘six principles’38 that should inform anti-bribery proced-
ures, the overwhelming impression given is of a need for ‘hands on’
preventative (regulatory) impact, even though the language itself is
permissive in character. For example, in a case study to demonstrate
the need for adequate communication and training (Principle 5), the
Guidance suggests that when dealing with a commercial agent (K) in a
foreign country where there is a high risk of bribery, a ﬁrm (J) ‘could
consider’:
Making employees of J engaged in bidding for business fully aware of J’s
anti-bribery statement [and] code of conduct … Including suitable con-
tractual terms on bribery prevention measures in the agreement between
J and K … Supplementing the information, where appropriate, with
specially prepared training to J’s staff involved with the foreign country.39
For the government itself to be suggesting prophylactic measures at this
level of detail, while at the same maintaining that ﬁrms are perfectly free
to avoid taking any notice whatsoever of the measures, creates a tension
between an ofﬁcially endorsed criminal offence-led strategy and a
‘shadow’ regulatory strategy. Mavericks will largely ignore ‘bureaucratic
red tape’ of this kind, and are likely to be deterred only by a real prospect
of criminal prosecution and punishment: at the heart of a criminal
offence-led strategy. By contrast, only the conscientious will take the
‘red tape’ seriously, undermining the claim that the guidance is not
principally (or at all) aimed at, ‘unduly burdening the vast majority of
decent, law-abiding ﬁrms’.40
What is more, the SFO, although thwarted in its attempts to strike
legally binding plea bargains,41 is already behaving in an important sense
38 ‘Proportionate procedures’, ‘top-level commitment’, ‘risk assessment’, ‘due diligence’,
‘communication’, ‘monitoring and review’.
39 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance, p.49.
40 See n. 39, above.
41 See R. v. Innospec Ltd [2010] EW Misc 7, 26 March 2010, available at: www.judiciary.gov.
uk/media/judgments/2010/r-v-bae-systems-plc (sentencing remarks of Thomas LJ).
However, see now the plans of the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General for deferred
prosecution agreements to tackle economic crime, available at: www.attorneygeneral.gov.
uk/NewsCentre/Pages/Newtoolto tackleeconomiccrime.aspx.
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as if it were a regulatory authority. For example, in one case it rewarded
self-reporting (confession) by an offender through showing itself willing
to facilitate the improvement of compliance programmes agreed as a part
of sentence:
The company [Mabey & Johnson] having agreed that it would be subject
to ﬁnancial penalties to be assessed by the Court, will pay reparations and
will submit its internal compliance programme to an SFO approved
independent monitor.42
In legal policy terms, we appear to be in no-man’s land, stuck with a
purportedly criminal offence-led strategy whose speciﬁcs nonetheless
draw heavily on practices common to a regulatory strategy. That position
may be made to work (scholars can always tell you why something that
may work perfectly well in practice does not work in theory), but it is an
opportunity missed to develop a context-sensitive and coherent regula-
tory strategy to prevent bribery and corruption.
That brings me to the second question bearing on the case for a
regulatory strategy to deal with bribery. As I indicated earlier, the risk
of wrongdoing in many areas of corporate and commercial activity is
now confronted through a mixture of traditional criminal offences (such
as theft and fraud), more specialised criminal offences, and sometimes
also civil penalties: in essence, a regulatory strategy. The question is
whether activities liable to carry a risk of bribery and corruption are so
different in nature or context that they are not appropriately subjected to
the same treatment. I argue that they are not so different. To begin with,
it is already the case that prosecutors and regulatory authorities have
been adopting a make-do-and-mend approach towards the absence of a
regulatory strategy to deal with instances of bribery where the costs of,
and risk of failure in, a criminal prosecution for bribery itself have been
too high. Prosecutors and regulators have used specialised regulatory
offences, or civil penalties, concerned with risky accounting malpractice
to deal with instances of corruption where use of the pre-2010 Act law
would have been impossible or inappropriate:
(1) In January 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) ﬁned the
insurer AON £5.25 million for failing to take reasonable care to
establish and maintain effective systems and controls to counter
42 Available at: www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/mabey –
johnson-ltd-sentencing-.aspx.
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the risks of bribery and corruption associated with making payments
to overseas ﬁrms and individuals. AON had made what were
described as ‘suspicious’ payments of US$7 million to overseas ﬁrms
and individuals who were assisting AON to win business. AON
cooperated with the FSA and agreed the settlement. The case
followed proactive steps taken by the FSA in 2007, in which it sent
out an industry-wide letter to commercial insurance intermediaries
reminding them of their regulatory obligations in relation to the risks
of bribery and corruption.43
(2) In 2010, British Aerospace Defence Systems (BAE Systems) was
convicted under section 221(5) of the Companies Act 1985, in
respect of failures to keep proper accounting records to show and
explain certain payments that it had made. These payments, to a
covert adviser, related to a contract to supply a radar defence system
in Tanzania at Dar-es-Salaam airport. To cover the activities of its
covert advisers on conﬁdential matters, the company set up a BVI-
based company, Red Diamond Trading Company. Red Diamond
Trading made a secret agreement with a covert adviser to pay, to a
Panamanian company controlled by the adviser, up to just over 30
per cent of the contract price, although publicly the adviser was set to
receive only 1 per cent of the contract price. No auditor inspecting
BAE Systems’ accounts would have discovered these arrangements.
The agent was paid over US$12 million. The company was ﬁned
£500,000, but also agreed to make a payment of £29.5 million to
Tanzania in the form of ex gratia compensation.44
Whether or not these individual cases could have been successfully
prosecuted as bribery cases, it is certainly one of the major aims of the
2010 Act, and in particular of the section 7 offence of failing to prevent
bribery, to target egregious cases of this type. Convictions under section 7
would enable the nature and amount of harm actually done to be better
reﬂected through both criminal conviction and sentence; but this is not
my present concern. More signiﬁcant, in the present context, is that
the alternatives to prosecution employed in these cases stemmed from
legislation that was not primarily intended to deal with bribery and
corruption. Quite simply, there is no set of specialised offences or civil
43 See www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/004.shtml.
44 For the relevant links, see www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-
releases-2010/bae-ﬁned-in-tanzania-defence-contract-case.aspx.
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penalties – putting aside the general offences of assistance and encourage-
ment45 – dealing with conduct posing an unacceptable risk of bribery.46
I have already alluded to the contrast, in this respect, with corporate
manslaughter.47 Shoring up this offence there is a long-standing regime
of specialised criminal offences relating to health and safety, whose
prosecution is in the hands of an expert regulatory authority (the Health
and Safety Executive) that also issues guidance on, among other things,
good practice in particular industries.48 Moving beyond that example, set
against the background of the serious offences created by the Fraud Act
2006, there are a very large number of specialised regulatory criminal
laws and civil penalties to deal with fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation
and wrongful failure to provide information in a wide variety of indus-
tries.49 More broadly in relation to the provision of ﬁnancial services, the
FSA exists as a specialised body to provide regulatory oversight of the
ﬁnancial sector in the interest of the consumer.50 The FSA has the power
to impose civil penalties on those who have engaged in misconduct, and
this power can be used in pursuit of one of its four statutory objectives:
‘ﬁghting ﬁnancial crime’.51 A very signiﬁcant proportion of such special-
ised regulatory offences and civil penalties deal with unacceptably risky
conduct, rather than with harm done. The primary concern (admittedly
also true, albeit more controversially, of the Fraud Act 2006), is the giving
of false or misleading information, the concealment of important infor-
mation, the maintenance of poor accounting practices and similar con-
duct of the ‘ticking time bomb’ variety: the conduct has not as yet caused
harm, but creates an unacceptable risk that such harm may be done.
Closer to present theme (but still in the shadow of the Fraud Act
2006), there is now an expert authority, the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority, charged with devising a code of conduct to
45 See Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2.
46 In some contexts, potentially corrupt conduct may be dealt with by specialised fraud
offences: see, e.g., the offences in the Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 206–210.
47 See text following n. 29, above.
48 See www.hse.gov.uk/business/index.htm.
49 See Law Commission, ‘Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts’, paras 3.123–3.128,
4.62–4.81. See also the enormous number of specialised ﬁnance-related offences set out in
J. Richardson (ed.), Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2010 (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), ch. 30 (‘Commerce, ﬁnancial markets and insolvency’).
50 See also Monteith, Chapter 9, this volume.
51 The FSA was set up under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to pursue the
‘regulatory objectives’ of ‘market conﬁdence’, ‘ﬁnancial stability’, ‘the protection of
consumers’ and ‘the reduction of ﬁnancial crime’ (s. 2).
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eliminate what has hitherto been the participation of MPs in borderline
corrupt practices in making expense claims.52 The Authority can investi-
gate possible breaches of the code, which is backed up with a specialised
regulatory offence of making a claim, knowing it is supported by false or
misleading information.53 What kind of regulatory offences or civil
penalties would be appropriate if the 2010 Act were to be embedded, at
least in some sectors of commerce, in a more regulatory strategy?
It is noticeable that the US Federal anti-bribery statute, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 1977, contains a linked set of criminal and civil
provisions.54 First, there is the main bribery offence (of a kind now found
in section 6 of the 2010 Act). Secondly, there are accounting provisions –
aimed at issuers of securities – that require the maintenance of accurate
corporate books and records and internal company controls to prevent
misuse of corporate funds, especially for the purpose of bribery. Admit-
tedly, there is no exact equivalent of the section 7 offence (failure to
prevent bribery) in the 1977 Act. However, very broadly speaking, under
US law companies are held strictly liable for the corrupt actions of their
employees (if not their agents).55 That diminishes, albeit without elimin-
ating, the signiﬁcance of the extra reach provided by the section 7
offence. Additionally, it is important to note that the prosecuting author-
ity, the Department of Justice, has at its disposal civil penalties that can
be imposed when the offender has acted ‘corruptly’ (additional proof of
‘wilfulness’ is required for criminal conviction).56 This is something with
no equivalent in the 2010 Act, given the avowedly criminal offence-led
52 The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority was set up under the Parliamentary
Standards Act 2009.
53 Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, s. 10. Perhaps predictably, the regulatory offence
covers ground already covered by the Fraud Act 2006 (or by an attempt to commit an
offence under that Act), but with a maximum sentence of only one year’s imprisonment,
as compared with ten years under the Fraud Act 2006. Further, the regulatory offence is
narrower in scope, requiring (unlike the Fraud Act 2006) knowledge of the false or
misleading nature of the information supporting the claim. I know of no other regulated
group so favoured by the narrowness of the fault requirement in the only regulatory
offence applicable to it.
54 For an appreciative evaluation of the FCPA 1977, see now N. Cropp, ‘The Bribery Act
2010: A Comparison with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Nuance v. Nous’, Criminal
Law Review, 2 (2011), 122–40.
55 See, e.g., the general discussion in H. Lowell Brown, ‘Vicarious Criminal Liability of
Corporations for the Acts of their Employees and Agents’, Loyola Law Review, 41 (1995),
279–327; see also the discussion in Cropp, ‘The Bribery Act 2010’.
56 See the discussion by Cropp, ‘The Bribery Act 2010’, p. 128.
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nature of its strategy.57 Even with such a strategy solely in mind, though,
some consideration might have been given to turning the civil offence
created by the FSA – failing to take reasonable care to establish and
maintain effective systems and controls to counter the risks of bribery
and corruption58 – into a more general regulatory criminal offence under
the 2010 Act.59 Building on that possibility, it would have been possible
to introduce such an offence, but make its application limited to particu-
lar kinds of transaction through the use of secondary legislation.
Examples are transactions governed by the Export Control Act 2002
(‘the 2002 Act’), such as defence contracts, consideration of which helps
us to contrast the criminal offence-led strategy of the 2010 Act with the
regulatory approach of the 2002 Act.60
A regulatory strategy to deter bribery: the case of the arms industry
The US Department of Commerce has suggested that something like 50
per cent of all bribery allegations in the late 1990s were in the defence
sector, in spite of the fact that this sector accounts for only 1 per cent of
world trade.61 In 2006, Britain was ranked second in the world in terms
of its expenditure on military equipment (US$61,925 million), behind
only the United States (US$546,018 million). BAE Systems – the fourth
largest defence manufacturer in the world in 2005 – is dependent for 79
per cent of its income on defence contracts. About 60 per cent of the
global arms trade is accounted for by developing countries, where the risk
57 Under the 1977 Act, settlements with offenders almost always include an agreement
whereby an independent monitor is retained by the offending ﬁrm for a number of years.
In the interests of compliance, the monitor has the power to obtain documents, and to
recommend reform of the ﬁrm’s practices, and hence its culture. Such agreements are
virtually unheard of in the United Kingdom, although the SFO’s settlement with Mabey &
Johnson (referred to at n. 42, above) is a version of this.
58 See text at n. 43, above.
59 The Joint Committee on the draft Bribery Bill opposed the introduction of regulatory civil
penalties, seemingly on the assumption that they would be taking the place of, rather than
(as suggested here) supplementing criminal legislation, available at: www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtbribe/115/11508.htm#a16, paras 88–90.
60 See further, Z. Yihdego and A. Savage, ‘The Arms Export Regime: Progress and Chal-
lenges’, Public Law, Autumn (2008), 546–65.
61 US Department of Commerce Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee Report (March
2010), cited by the Committee on Arms Export Controls, ‘Scrutiny of Arms Export
Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly Reports
for 2009, Licensing Policy and Review of Export Control Legislation’ (2010 HC 202),
para. 108.
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of bribery and corruption is also much higher than in the developed
world.62 It is obvious that very considerable risks are present for both the
ﬁrms in question and the state when ﬁrms export military hardware and
equipment. For example, such goods may end up being used against
civilians, or against combatants from the exporting state itself or from its
allies.63 Such risks also exist in relation to the export of material of use in
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction or devices commonly associ-
ated with torture; and the risks extend to the provision of certain kinds of
service rather than goods, such as ‘know-how’ or technical assistance in
relation to the use of the items just mentioned. For these reasons, certain
kinds of technology transfer or expert assistance, along with the export
(and import) of items of the relevant type – and of certain ‘dual use’ items
that may have legitimate or illegitimate uses – are governed by the 2002
Act. There is no space to say much about it here, but the 2002 Act is an
unusual piece of legislation from a criminal lawyer’s point of view.
The 2002 Act is almost entirely ‘permissive’, granting powers to the
Secretary of State to introduce through secondary legislation regulatory
controls over exports and the provision of services of certain kinds (such
as those just mentioned), and to create criminal offences in the same
manner for breaches of the controls.64 Consider, by way of example, the
criminal law-creating activities of the Department for Business, Innov-
ation and Skills (BIS) in 2008, under the 2002 Act. In 2008, BIS created
no less than thirty-one criminal offences by Order under the 2002 Act.
These offences are targeted at conduct that, more or less directly or
indirectly, unjustiﬁably increases the risk that wrongful harm may be
done. In this context, an example of conduct prohibited because it more
directly increases the risk of wrongful harm being done is the prohibition
involved in providing Burma with ﬁnancial assistance related to military
activities.65 Given the directness of the increase in risk involved in such
62 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook, Armaments, Disarmament
and International Security (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 326.
63 For example, the Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard carrier-borne strike ﬁghter, although
designated for the French navy, was ﬁrst used in combat by Argentina against British
forces. Fourteen such aircraft had been purchased by Argentina in 1980, after an arms
embargo imposed by the United States in the light of the political situation in Argentina,
which meant that spare parts for Argentina’s US-made planes became unavailable.
Twenty members of the crew of HMS Shefﬁeld were killed in an Argentine attack
employing one of these ﬁghters on 4 May 1982.
64 On the regulatory nature of such offences, see text following n. 47, above.
65 Export Control (Burma) Order No. 2008/1098.
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conduct, the conduct will not be licensed by the UK Government in any
circumstances. Other offences are targeted at more indirect ways in
which risks of wrongful harm being done may unjustiﬁably be increased
(a common example is failing to ensure one’s vehicle has a valid MOT
certiﬁcate).66 In this context, prohibitions on indirectly risk-enhancing
conduct can be found in rules and regulations governing the conditions
on which one is entitled to engage in primary activities governed by
Orders issued under the 2002 Act. An example is making a false state-
ment or furnishing a document or information which to an applicant’s
knowledge is false in a material particular (ex hypothesi, in order to
obtain an export licence).67 Another example is failing to comply with
any of the requirements or conditions to which a licence is subject.68
Under the main piece of secondary legislation in this ﬁeld, the Export
Control Order 2008, we can see prohibitions on directly risk-enhancing
conduct (paragraph (4), below) and more indirectly risk-enhancing con-
duct (paragraphs (6) and (7), below) placed together, as part of a coher-
ent hierarchy of offences:
35 … (4) Subject to paragraph (8), a person knowingly concerned in an
activity prohibited or restricted by Article 3(1), 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) or 21(1) of
the dual-use Regulation with intent to evade the relevant prohibition or
restriction commits an offence and may be arrested.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under paragraph (4) shall be liable: …
(b) on conviction on indictment to a ﬁne or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years, or to both.
(6) A person who fails to comply with Article 9(1) (provision of
relevant information for licence applications) of the dual-use Regulation
commits an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a ﬁne
not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale and any licence which may
have been granted in connection with the application shall be void as
from the time it was granted.
(7) A person who fails to comply with Article 16 (record-keeping), 21(5)
(records of exportation and transfer of listed items within the customs
territory) or 21(7) (requirement in relation to commercial documents for
exportation and transfer of listed items within the customs territory) of the
dual-use Regulation commits an offence and shall be liable on summary
conviction to a ﬁne not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
66 This example can explained more casuistically. It is a kind of ‘secondary’ prohibition, a
prohibition on risk-enhancing conduct whose unjustiﬁability needs to be understood in
relation to a ‘primary’ prohibition: in this case, the offence (and the offences related to it)
of dangerous driving.
67 Export Control Order No. 2008/3231. 68 Export Control Order No. 2008/3231.
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Consistent with the regulatory nature of the export control strategy,
there is a specialist agency, the Export Control Organisation,69 responsible
for taking prophylactic steps to avoid breaches of the legislation, through
(for example) compliance visits to companies registered for export
licences. Where breaches of export control legislation are suspected, they
may be investigated by a specialist arm of Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs (HMRC), on whose behalf a prosecution may be taken by the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).70 Typically, there are also between 50
and 100 instances annually in which HMRC seizes goods subject to export
control that appear to be intended for export without a valid licence.71 The
Committee on Arms Export Controls has also advocated the introduction
of civil penalties to buttress the regulatory criminal law.72
This background is of relevance here because there is a close associ-
ation between defence (and associated) contracting, and the payment of
bribes. Bribes may be paid to obtain or keep contracts. However, bribes
may also be paid to secure evasion of rules meant to govern how, when,
on what terms and so on, such contracts are entered into. A simple
example of the latter would be a secret payment to an ofﬁcial to issue a
licence to a ﬁrm to export military hardware, even though the exporter
has not met the conditions for the issue of such a licence. A more
complex example would be a secret payment by a UK ﬁrm to an end-
user of military equipment authorised by the UK Government (say, a
stable democracy), whereby the authorised end-user agrees to allow an
unauthorised end-user (say, a state illegally occupying another state’s
territory) to purchase that equipment from the authorised end-user if
they wish to do so. The close connection between bribery and defence
contracting73 has led respected organisations such as Transparency Inter-
national, as well as the UK’s Committee on Arms Export Controls,74 to
69 See www.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol.
70 See www.berr.gov.uk/policies/export-control-organisation/eco-press-prosecutions.
71 ‘Security of Arms Export Control: First Joint Report (2007/8) of the Committee on Arms
Export Controls’ (2008 HC 254), para. 49.
72 Committee on Arms Export Controls, ‘Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls’, (2009 HC
178), paras 81–85.
73 Recently noted by the Committee on Arms Export Controls, ‘Scrutiny of Arms Export
Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports
for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation – Committee on Arms
Export Controls’ (2011 HC 686), paras 108–116.
74 See n. 25, above, at para. 115; C. Courtney, ‘Corruption in the Ofﬁcial Arms Trade’, in
Transparency International (UK), Policy Research Paper No. 001 (London: Transparency
International, 2002).
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recommend the introduction of (in effect) a more regulatory strategy to
combat bribery in this ﬁeld. The UK Committee recommended
extending the remit of the Export Control Organisation to include
prophylactic measures to prevent bribery and corruption in its process-
ing of applications for export licences:75
the creation of a requirement for those seeking export licences to produce
a declaration that the export contract has not been obtained through
bribery or corruption; the revocation of licences where an exporter had
been convicted of corruption; and the amendment of the National Export
Licensing Criteria to make conviction for corruption by an exporter
grounds for refusing an export licence.76
For its part, in 2002, Transparency International made recommendations
along similar lines:
Recommendation 2: export licensing should be strictly conditional on
presentation by exporting countries of rigorous contract-speciﬁc no-
bribery warranties. These should be reinforced by evidence that com-
panies have in place sufﬁcient internal compliance systems capable of
detecting corruption-risk and preventing the payment of bribes. Exclu-
sion from export licences should be used as a sanction against companies
or brokers found to have paid bribes …
Recommendation 7: Prior scrutiny of individual licences should be
undertaken by a Parliamentary Committee of both Houses to ensure that
sales conform with the UK Consolidated Criteria. This Committee should
consider the potential for corruption in the procurement process in the
importing country in its advice to the government on whether to award
the licence.77
The ‘reinforcing’ measures in Recommendation 2 look very much like
the substance of the guidance now issued to ﬁrms on what should be
taken into account in determining whether ‘adequate procedures’ were in
place to avoid bribery being committed on a ﬁrm’s behalf.78 There is,
though, a strong argument that such prophylactic regulatory measures
should be mandatory in this sector of the economy, not merely advisory
in all sectors (as they now are). In other words, it should not be left to the
general prohibitions in the 2010 Act to deter and prevent bribery by
incentivising only (potential) perpetrators. The strong association
between defence contracting and the risk of corruption should
75 See n. 25 above, at para. 117. 76 HC (2007/8) 254, paras. 112–117.
77 Courtney, ‘Corruption in the Ofﬁcial Arms Trade’, p. 6. 78 See n. 38, above.
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additionally be regarded as a reason to give ofﬁcials and experts working
in export control powers to develop a proactive regulatory strategy, to
reduce the risk of perpetration by focusing on ‘at risk’ companies and
risky practices.
Regrettably, that is not to be government policy in the near future.
The ofﬁcial response of the Business, Innovation and Skills Minister,
Mr Mark Prisk MP, to the proposal that the risk of corruption should be
added speciﬁcally as a reason to refuse an export licence was to say:
I don’t think it’s something we would be minded to support, and I doubt
whether it would be successful. I think on the whole we’ve got to distin-
guish here between dealing with the risks of an unacceptable use or an
illegal use, and how a contract is secured, and they’re actually two distinct
things, so I think we shouldn’t confuse in law those two different
elements.79
What all this shows is that the UK’s commitment to an anti-corruption
policy is not fully worked through, and is in effect half-hearted. The UK
Government has adopted a criminal offence-led strategy without explain-
ing why a (prophylactic) regulatory strategy, common to UK policy both
in combating fraud and – to use my special focus – in reducing irrespon-
sible exporting, is not also a necessary element in tackling bribery, if that
is to be done in a fully committed way. Naturally, many will share the
government’s fears about the burdensomeness of increased regulatory
impact in general. Acknowledging that, the government has nonetheless
failed to explain why a regulatory strategy to address bribery should not
be implemented sectorally. There is an extremely strong case for making
the guidance on adequate anti-corruption procedures mandatory in some
industries, even if it is only advisory for other industries, if the United
Kingdom, as a world leader in arms export, is to be taken seriously as a
force in anti-corruption policy across the world.
Conclusion
The criminal offence-led strategy for bribery has brought some improve-
ments in the law, but government commitment to anti-corruption policy
remains half-hearted. The strategy is unlikely to work as effectively as it
might have done had it been supplemented by a regulatory strategy
79 Cited by the Committee on Arms Export Controls, n. 73, above, para. 114.
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aimed at reducing the risks of bribery being committed. That regulatory
strategy could, in the ﬁrst instance, have been targeted at sectors of
industry, and practices such as commission payments, prone to bribery
and corruption. Ironically, the scheme recently introduced under the
Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 to deter misuse, and govern the use,
of expense claims by MPs provides a rudimentary model.
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